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1Rethinking Blockchains in the Internet of Things Era
from a Wireless Communication Perspective
Hongxin Wei, Wei Feng, Yunfei Chen, Cheng-Xiang Wang, and Ning Ge
Abstract—Due to the rapid development of Internet of Things
(IoT), a massive number of devices are connected to the Internet.
For these distributed devices in IoT networks, how to ensure
their security and privacy becomes a significant challenge. The
blockchain technology provides a promising solution to protect
the data integrity, provenance, privacy, and consistency for
IoT networks. In blockchains, communication is a prerequisite
for participants, which are distributed in the system, to reach
consensus. However, in IoT networks, most of the devices com-
municate through wireless links, which are not always reliable.
Hence, the communication reliability of IoT devices influences
the system security. In this article, we rethink the roles of
communication and computing in blockchains by accounting
for communication reliability. We analyze the tradeoff between
communication reliability and computing power in blockchain
security, and present a lower bound to the computing power
that is needed to conduct an attack with a given communication
reliability. Simulation results show that adversarial nodes can
succeed in tampering a block with less computing power by
hindering the propagation of blocks from other nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The blockchain technology emerges as a distributed crypto-
based ledger system, which runs in a decentralized mode and
does not need a central controller. Being open, transparent,
traceable, and tamper-resistant, the blockchain technology pro-
vides a solution for trusted value exchange among the nodes
regardless of whether a participator is a human or a machine.
It does not require participators in the system to have any
prior knowledge before trading, or to rely on any third-party
authority such as a bank. The blockchain technology is the
key technology for Bitcoin, which was invented by Satoshi
Nakamoto in 2008 [1]. Later, smart contracts are introduced
into blockchains. Smart contracts are executable programs,
which are stored in blockchains and run on blockchains to
execute the agreement coded in the programs. As smart con-
tracts become prevalent, the blockchain technology has found
its applications in such areas as finance, banking, intellectual
property, and logistics.
Along with the development of Internet of Things (IoT),
more and more devices are connected to the Internet, such
as intelligent vehicles [2], devices for smart homes, home
security, and health care. For these distributed devices in IoT
networks, how to ensure their security and privacy becomes a
significant challenge [3]. The blockchain technology provides a
promising solution to protecting the data integrity, provenance,
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privacy, and consistency for IoT networks [4]. Furthermore, by
applying the blockchain technology to the exchange of services
or data between IoT devices, the value of the information in
IoT networks could be activated and amplified. Smart contracts
will greatly stimulate the efficiency of information exchange
in IoT networks. This will, in turn, trigger an increase of
applications of IoT, such as software updates, sharing of
service and property (e.g. house sharing, bicycle sharing, and
car sharing), and smart supply chain with auto payment.
For most machine-to-machine devices and wearable de-
vices in IoT networks, data are conveyed through wireless
communications [5]. In the future, there will be a lot of
blockchain nodes communicating through wireless links. How-
ever, wireless communication is not always reliable, and hence
messages broadcast in wireless blockchain networks may be
lost. Therefore, the outage probability of the wireless links
in a blockchain system may influence the performance of
the system. Nakamoto analyzed the influence of computing
on the security of Bitcoin, and concluded that, if attacks
attempt to replace a block, they have to own more than 50
percent of the total computing power in a blockchain network,
which is usually referred to as “51% attack” [1]. However,
in Nakamoto’s analysis, the communication reliability of the
network is not considered.
Several researchers have discussed the influence of com-
munication on the performance of blockchains. Decker and
Wattenhofer showed that information propagation speed could
influence the performance of blockchain systems [6]. Danzi et
al. analyzed the effect of communication quality on blockchain
synchronization for IoT networks [7]. Sun et al. analyzed
the transaction throughput and communication throughput in
blockchain-enabled wireless IoT networks [8]. In their analy-
sis, node geographical distribution and transaction arrival rate
are modeled as Poisson point processes. Kim analyzed the
impact of mobility on blockchain performance in vehicular
ad-hoc networks [9]. In [10] and [11], the authors presented
an “eclipse attack” algorithm, in which adversarial nodes can
earn more rewards by manipulating the communication in
the networks. To conduct an eclipse attack, attackers need
to monopolize all the connections of the victim node, thus
other nodes cannot receive blocks from the victim node and
the attackers will be more likely to win the mining competition.
In this article, we focus on the influence of communica-
tion reliability on the security of blockchains. The tradeoff
between communication reliability and computing power for
blockchains is analyzed. Simulation results show that by affect-
ing the communication reliability of the network, adversarial
nodes can use less computing power to tamper a block, which
has been confirmed by the blockchain network. The main
2Figure 1: Illustration of the roles of communication and
computing in blockchains.
contributions of this article include:
 The blockchain technology is rethought from a commu-
nication perspective. The roles of communication and
computing in blockchains are clarified.
 The tradeoff between communication reliability and
computing power in blockchain security is analyzed. We
also present a lower bound of computing power that is
needed to conduct an attack with a given communication
reliability.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section
II, we briefly introduce the fundamentals of blockchain tech-
nology and the role of communications in blockchains. In
Section III, the tradeoff between communication reliability and
computing power is analyzed. In Section IV, simulation results
are presented, and some open issues are discussed. Finally,
conclusions are given in Section V.
II. THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION IN BLOCKCHAINS
The blockchain technology is rooted in the synergy of com-
munication and computing. Communication and computing
jointly make the distributed ledgers reliable and consistent. In
Fig. 1, we explain the roles of communication and computing
in blockchains.
In a blockchain, data are stored in blocks, and blocks
are organized in a chain. The chained blocks are stored in
distributed nodes, and each node could keep a complete replica
of the whole chain. In Fig. 1, Block #3 shows the data structure
of Bitcoin. In each block, there are two parts. The first part
is the block head. Some key data fields in the block head of
Bitcoin are listed in the figure. The other part is the body of the
block. In a blockchain system, data are written in transactions,
and transactions are stored in the body of the block. The block
head contains four critical fields: the parent hash, the Merkle
tree hash [12], the nonce, and the timestamp. The parent hash
is the hash of the previous block. It guarantees that the blocks
are linked together in series. The Merkle tree hash is the root
value of the Merkle tree, which represents all the transactions
in the current block. In a Merkle tree, the value of a leaf node
is the hash of the transaction data, and the value of a non-leaf
node is the hash of its children’s values. In Bitcoin, leaf nodes
keep the hash of transactions. The value of the Merkle tree root
could be used to verify whether all the data in leaf nodes of the
tree have been changed. If the value of one node is changed,
the value of its parent will change. As a result, the value of the
Merkle tree root will change, and the hash of the block will
change. For example, in Block #3 in Fig. 1, “TX1” and “TX2”
are transaction data, “H1” and “H2” are the hashes of “TX1”
and “TX2”, “H12” is the hash of “H1H2”, the Merkle tree root
“H1234” is the hash of “H12H34”. If “TX1” is tampered, then
“H1”, “H12”, “H1234” and the hash of the block will change.
The nonce is a random number, which is used to determine
who generates the current block. The timestamp is used to
record the time when the block is created. It provides a proof
of existence at a certain time in the right order.
In a typical blockchain network, all nodes are equal and
connected with each other in a peer-to-peer (P2P) mode.
Every node exchanges information, including transactions and
blocks, with its neighboring nodes. This is different from
the conventional Client-Server (CS) or Browser-Server (BS)
network structure, where all the data are transmitted to a
server first and then the server processes and forwards them
to the destinations. Some nodes access the network through
wired links, and the others through wireless links. Any device
running blockchain programs can join the blockchain network,
such as a computer, a smartphone, a pair of smart glasses, a
smart car, a smart refrigerator, or a router.
In Fig. 2, we present a case study of Bitcoin to demonstrate
how a blockchain works [1]. In the system, there are five
nodes: A, B, C, D, and E. Each node has a copy of the
entire blockchain. Initially, the blockchain contains two blocks:
Block #1 and Block #2. The key information that is needed to
perform a transaction on Bitcoin network is contained in the
blocks. In a typical blockchain system, the transaction process
consists of four main steps:
1) Transmission of transactions. Assume that a new trans-
action is to commence at node B. The transaction
is digitally signed by the payer via encrypting the
transaction with its private encryption key. The digital
signature can ensure that no one else can create fake
transactions on behalf of the payer. Denote the digitally
signed transaction as TX. Then, TX is broadcast from
node B to other nodes.
2) Computing to generate a new block. Upon receiving
TX, other nodes can place TX into a transaction pool to
form a new block. Assume all nodes pack TX into a new
3Figure 2: Transaction procedures of a blockchain using PoW consensus.
block as a candidate for Block #3, and start performing
calculation tasks for winning the competition for Block
#3. The nodes participating in the calculation tasks are
called miners. The operation of performing calculation
tasks is called mining. For Bitcoin, miners attempt to
find a target nonce, which makes the hash of the block
head less than a target value. The target value is an
indicator of the difficulty of mining a new block. With
a smaller target value, it is more difficult to find a
target nonce. Once a target nonce is found, the block is
generated successfully, and the miner will be rewarded
with some coins.
3) Transmission of the newly mined block. Assume the
node A first finds a target nonce and works out Block
#3. Then, it broadcasts the block to other nodes as soon
as possible to get the block confirmed by others.
4) Verifying the validity of the received block. After a node
receives Block #3, it attempts to verify the validity of
the received block by checking whether the data format
of the block is correct, whether all transactions in the
block have been signed correctly and their payers can
afford them, and whether the nonce and timestamp of
the block are legal. If the block passes the verification,
it will be stored in the local database. Through these
processes, the transaction is recorded in the blockchain
across the network.
In a blockchain, computing mainly occurs in the consensus
mechanisms, including producing digital signatures in Step
1, computing hash in Step 2, and verifying data in Step 4.
Consensus mechanisms are used to guarantee that the ledgers
distributed at different nodes will reach consistency in the long
term. Otherwise, if everyone possesses a different version, the
ledgers could not function well. Take Bitcoin as an example,
the consensus mechanism that searches for a target nonce
like solving puzzles is called proof-of-work (PoW). PoW is
currently used in the two most popular blockchain systems:
Bitcoin and Ethereum [13]. In PoW consensus mechanisms,
if an attacker attempts to change the ith block, it has to
conduct all the PoW calculation tasks from the ith block to
the latest block. These tasks need a great deal of computing
power in Bitcoin and Ethereum networks, as the computing
power for them is already very high. Hence, there is barely an
incentive for attackers to tamper data in old blocks. Notably,
in PoW consensus mechanisms, searching for a target nonce
is not very efficient and consumes a lot of energy. Hence,
some other consensus mechanisms are explored, such as Paxos,
practical byzantine fault tolerant (PBFT), proof-of-stake (PoS),
delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS), and proof-of-activity (PoA)
[14].
The role of communication in blockchains is to enable the
highly distributed data in all the nodes to finally reach a
consensus and increase the total consensus information of the
system. When some data need to be stored in a blockchain,
miners need to perform computing tasks to search for proper
nonces, and the total amount of information in all nodes
increases. But the information in consistency does not increase
simultaneously, as the information at distributed nodes has not
reached a consensus. Via communications between the nodes,
all the nodes can reach consistency, and the total amount of
consensus information increases.
III. TRADEOFF BETWEEN COMMUNICATION RELIABILITY
AND COMPUTING POWER
From the procedure described in Fig. 2, it can be seen that
transactions and blocks need to be broadcast among all nodes.
If the block is not spread to other nodes in Step 3, it is uncertain
that Block #3 will be successfully accepted by other nodes, and
attackers may have more chances to tamper the data. Therefore,
the security of the system depends not only on the computing
power, but also on the communication reliability.
Consider a simplified scenario, where there exists one hostile
node while other nodes are honest. The hostile node tries to
produce blocks that contain fake transactions to steal digital
assets in the blockchain system. For example, the attacker
4may create two transactions for different destination nodes,
in order to implement a double-spend attack [1]. Assume
the probability that the hostile node works out a new block
earlier than the honest nodes is qw; 0  qw  1, and
the probability that honest nodes succeed is pw = 1   qw.
During the communication process, the block may be lost or
go wrong because of channel fading, noise, and interference
in wireless communications, network congestion, and node
breakdown. Assume the probability that honest nodes succeed
in broadcasting the block in a round is qc; 0  qc  1, where
qc measures the communication reliability of honest nodes.
Denote q as the probability that the hostile node wins in a
round of competition for generating a new block. In a round,
q could be calculated as qwqw+pwqc . If the hostile node attempts
to tamper the data in a block, assume the block is zth ahead
of the latest block in the blockchain, then it has to tamper the
last z blocks. Assume P (z) is the probability that the hostile
node could finally catch up with other nodes and replace these
blocks. Denote Q = qwpwqc . According to the result in [1], P (z)
is one when Q  1, and Qz when Q < 1.
For scenarios with multiple hostile nodes, if all the hostile
nodes are cooperative, they can be regarded as a single
hostile node, whose total computing power is the sum of all
their computing power. The influence on the communication
reliability of the honest node is the combination of all their
influence. If all the hostile nodes are non-cooperative, each
hostile node attacks independently. Thus, for each hostile node,
the other hostile nodes can be viewed as honest nodes along
with the actual honest nodes during its attacking process.
In wireless communications, communication reliability
mainly depends on the transportation strategy and bit error
rate (BER). For a given modulation and coding scheme, BER
is mainly decided by signal to interference plus noise ratio
(SINR). Increasing SINR can decrease BER and increase
communication reliability. Hence, we use SINR as a metric of
communication reliability in the following analysis. Figure. 3
shows the mean of P (z) over 1000 trials with different pairs of
(qw, SINR). In the simulation, QPSK modulation and Rayleigh
fading channel with a scale parameter of 0.5 are used. z is set
to 6 and the block size is set to 8 Mbits. Each block is divided
into 1000 packets. If a packet is lost or any error occurs in the
packet transmission, the honest node can retransmit it until the
number of retries has reached a predetermined maximum retry
count. In Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b), the honest node is allowed to
make up to three and six retransmission attempts, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 3(a), when Q  1 as in Region A, the
hostile node could catch up sooner or later. When Q < 1
as in Region B, the probability that the hostile node could
succeed in attacking follows Qz with z. In the figure, the points
(0:55; 60) and (0:4; 45) are located in Region A. The point
(0:4; 60) is located in Region B. When SINR is bigger than
50 dB, the variation of SINR has little influence on P (z). This
is because, when SINR is high, qc approximately equals 1, and
Q approximately equals qw1 qw . In this case, increasing SINR
can hardly promote qc and Q. Thus, P (z) mainly depends on
qw. This is similar to the case in the conventional analysis,
which assumes perfect communications. If qw > 0:5 such
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Figure 3: The probability that the attacker can succeed with
six blocks behind: a) up to three retransmission attempts; b)
up to six retransmission attempts.
as the point (0:55; 60), the attacker will succeed eventually.
If qw < 0:5 such as the point (0:4; 60), it is not certain
that the attacker will succeed. However, when communication
reliability is considered, attackers may need less computing
power, and the “51% attack” does not hold anymore. Even
if the computing power is less than 50 percent, the attacker
can still conduct an attack by hindering the propagation of the
honest nodes. For example, the attacker can generate artificial
noise to lower the SINR at the honest nodes. The probability
of a successful attack can be further increased by increasing
the power of artificial noise. When SINR is lower than 40dB,
qc is close to zero. In this case, the attacker can conduct a
successful attack with little computing power.
Comparing Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b), it is clear that the point
(0:4; 45) is located in Region A when the maximum retry count
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Figure 4: Block gap between the hostile node and the honest
node in each round.
is 3, and in Region B when the maximum retry count is 6. This
indicates that increasing the number of retransmission attempts
can help the honest node lower the risk of being compromised
by attackers.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we perform numerical simulations to demon-
strate the influence of communications in a blockchain system.
In the simulations, there exists one hostile node and one honest
node, and the honest node stands for all other honest nodes.
In each round of the mining competition, the hostile node
and the honest node perform computing tasks to compete for
generating the new block. When the honest node succeeds,
it broadcasts the block to other nodes through wireless com-
munication channels. The wireless channels are modeled as
Rayleigh fading with parameter 0.5, and gray-coded QPSK
modulation is used. Each block contains 8 Mbits and is divided
into 1000 packets to transmit. If a packet is lost, the node is
allowed to make up to three retransmission attempts. When
the honest node receives a block from the hostile node, which
has a bigger block number than the longest chain in its buffer,
it will accept the block from the hostile node. In this state, the
attack of the hostile node is regarded as successful.
Figure. 4 shows the block gap between the honest node and
the hostile node at each round. Different pairs of (qw, SINR)
are simulated. The initial value of z is set to 6. When Q  1
such as the points (0:6; 60) and (0:4; 45), the hostile node
could eventually catch up, thus the gap gradually converges to
zero. When Q < 1 such as point (0:4; 60), the hostile node
has the chance to succeed, but not 100 percent. And the gap
expands gradually in the long term.
In Fig. 5, the average cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of a successful attack over 1000 trials is shown. The initial
value of z is set to 6. This figure shows the hostile node’s
0 10 20 30 40 50
Rounds
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
CD
F 
of
 s
uc
ce
ss
fu
l a
tta
ck
in
g
(0.4,60),3=0.67
(0.6,60),3=1.50
(0.4,45),3=3.57
Figure 5: CDF for different (qw, SINR) in each round.
attacking process for three pairs of (qw, SINR) at different
block numbers. When Q  1, the CDF of a successful attack
finally reaches 100 percent. And with larger Q, the attacking
process will be faster. When Q < 1, the CDF of successful
attack increases gradually, but the speed is slower. Notably,
the CDF in each odd round is the same as that in the previous
round. Let us assume that the hostile node can succeed in each
round. Then, it can catch up with the honest node in the sixth
round. If it fails in one of the first six rounds, after the sixth
round, it still needs to win two blocks to catch up with the
honest node. Hence, it cannot succeed in the seventh round,
and the probability that the hostile node succeeds within seven
rounds is the same as that within six rounds.
In Fig. 6, we simulate the influence of z with different
pairs of (qw, SINR). The probability of a successful attack is
calculated as the probability that the hostile node has caught up
with the honest node after a fixed number of blocks in order to
take place of some confirmed transactions. In the simulation,
the number is set to 1000, which is long enough to cover most
of the cases. In the figure, the average success probability over
1000 trials is shown with markers and the theoretical value of
P (z) is shown in curves. As is shown, the simulation results
perfectly match the calculations. When Q  1 such as the
point (0:4; 45), the hostile node could catch up finally, thus the
probability is 100 percent at different values of z. when Q < 1
such as the points (0:4; 50) and (0:4; 60), the probability that
the hostile node could succeed converges to zero exponentially.
Comparing these two curves, we can see that with smaller Q,
P (z) drops faster as z increases.
V. OPEN RESEARCH ISSUES
From the simulation and analysis, we have shown the trade-
off between communication reliability and computing power
in blockchains. However, there are still some open research
issues that need further study.
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1) Transportation strategies.
In a practical blockchain system, nodes may employ
some transportation control strategies such as automatic
repeat-request (ARQ). The influence of communica-
tions on blockchains with different transportation strate-
gies needs more in-depth research.
2) Network properties.
In this article, communication reliability is character-
ized by the average probability that an honest miner
succeeds in transmitting its newly mined block ahead
of the hostile nodes. However, some network properties
also affect communication reliability. For example, the
bandwidth and the transmission delay of honest nodes
affect the time, which is needed to propagate a block
to their neighbors. The network size and the number of
each node’s neighbors affect the total time needed to
propagate a block to all nodes. These parameters will
affect whether a hostile node can broadcast its newly
mined block before other nodes. Therefore, more details
about network settings should be taken into account.
3) Mining strategies.
In a blockchain, miners can decide when to broadcast
their newly mined blocks and whether to accept and
relay the blocks they received or not. Under different
mining algorithms, the impacts of communications are
different and necessary to be analyzed separately.
At present, the performance of blockchains remains to be a
setback for the popularization. In blockchains, the broadcast of
P2P networks is implemented by sending data to each node in
unicast mode. This is quite inefficient. In a blockchain system,
information dissemination has the following characteristics:
1) Broadcast.
In blockchains, transactions and blocks should be
broadcasted to all nodes.
2) Massive data.
When the number of nodes is large, the total amount
of data that need to be spread through the P2P network
are very huge.
3) Global decentralization.
For public blockchains, nodes are distributed around the
world. The route path of block dissemination is very
long, resulting in a very long time to diffuse a block.
If the broadcast property of wireless communications could
be incorporated into the data dissemination in blockchains, the
transmission efficiency will be enhanced. Furthermore, satellite
communications are featured with the advantages of wide-
range coverage and broadcast, which are suited to be applied in
blockchain systems to broadcast data. Thus, the transmission
efficiency of blockchains can be improved further.
On the other hand, blockchains can also be used in wireless
communication systems. With the features of decentraliza-
tion, integrity, traceable, tamper-resistant, programmable smart
contract, authority, and anonymity, the blockchain technology
has been used in resource management, access management,
and system configuration. In a conventional system, these
functions mainly rely on centralized management organiza-
tions. However, these organizations may abuse user data, leak
user privacy, and be vulnerable to single point failure and
denial of service (DoS) attack. Moreover, many management
organizations are very inefficient, which causes a waste of
resources. The blockchain technology provides a promising
solution to these problems.
Meanwhile, blockchain-based networks, especially IoT net-
works, will produce massive data. It is hard to process
and analyze these data manually. Artificial intelligence (AI)
technologies can be used to handle this problem. Through
data analysis and mining, AI can help to manage the system
more flexibly and intelligently. Authors in [15] have integrated
blockchain and AI to build a secure intelligent network for
5G beyond. In the future, more work about the integration
of blockchain and AI is needed to make the networks more
secure, intelligent, and efficient.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have clarified the roles of communication
and computing in blockchains. Furthermore, we have analyzed
the influence of communication reliability and computing
power on blockchain security for a PoW blockchain system,
as well as the tradeoff between them. Simulation results have
shown that by hindering the propagation of legal blocks from
other nodes, attackers could use less computing power to
replace blocks, which have been confirmed by the blockchain
networks. Therefore, the researchers of blockchains need to
pay more attention to the attack against the communication
networks. In future research, models of transportation strate-
gies, network properties, and mining strategies need further
study. Furthermore, AI technology can be integrated into the
blockchain-empowered IoT network to make it more intelligent
and efficient.
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